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Review Essays 
THE LIMITS OF GAYLAW 
GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF 
THE CLOSET. William N. Eskridge, Jr.' Harvard 
University Press. 1999. Pp. 512. $45.00. 
Dale Carpenter 
The world into which Gaylaw arrives is one whose poles are 
very far apart. At one pole, a man fatally fractures his dog's 
skull by beating him with a plastic vacuum cleaner accessory and 
then throwing the dog against a tree trunk.3 Why? The man 
concluded the dog was homosexual after he saw the poodle-
yorkshire terrier mix repeatedly attempt sexual activity with an-
other male terrier.4 At the man's subsequent trial for animal 
cruelty, a veterinarian testified that such behavior in dogs is a 
common way for them to assert dominance, rather than neces-
sarily a sexual act, much less evidence of a homosexual orienta-
tion. It's a measure of how deeply rooted shame and hostility 
about homosexuality are that, in the eyes of some, even a mutt's 
behavior is_ imbued with negative sexual significance in need of a 
corrective.) 
1. John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale University Law School 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I want to 
thank Don Dripps, Wayne Dynes, Daniel Farber, Mary Louise Fellows, Brett McDon-
nell, David McGowan, Stephen Murray, and Paul Rubin for helpful comments. 
3. "Ocala Man Sentenced to Six Months in Jail for Beating Dog," Associated 
Press (June 26, 2000); available in Wcstlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS Database. 
4. This is not the first time tht: concept of a gay dog has entered the public arena. 
An episode of the popular animated tdevision show, Sowh Park, satiriz.:d the fear of 
canine homosexuality. 
5. Another ad-ministration of scxuality-corr.:ctive occurred recently in New York. 
The parents of a 17-vcar-old Bronx youth kicked their son out of the house when he told 
them he was gay. Not content with that, the parents pursued him to the aunt's house 
where he had sought refuge and bt:at him repeatedly with a lead pipe and an unidentified 
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At the other pole, five days after the Associated Press re-
ported the gay dog-killing, a "civil unions" law took effect in 
Vermont. Pressured b~ the state supreme court to equalize 
benefits for gay couples, Vermont's governor signed a bill guar-
anteeing to registered same-sex couples all of the rights, privi-
leges, and responsibilities available to married couples under 
state (though not federal) law. 7 What separates gay couples 
from straight couples in the eyes of the state of Vermont is a 
word- "marriage"- and nothing more. It's a measure of how 
far the law has come in its disposition toward homosexuality that 
an American jurisdiction now has the most nearly equal legal re-
gime for gay couples that has ever existed.8 
Between these poles lie large continents of ignorance and 
understanding, of fear and acceptance, of shouted insults in high 
school hallways, of soldiers beaten while they sleep, of couples 
together for decades yet still strangers to the law, of religious 
people who love and irreligious people who hate, of law that 
forces separation and law that forces togetherness, and of every-
thing in between. It is a varied terrain, hard to map and harder 
to mold, yet the tectonic plates underneath it are unmistakably 
shifting. 
Part of Professor William Eskridge's mission in Gaylaw is to 
describe the historical development of the complex legal and, to 
some extent the cultural, landscape for gays. (pp. 17 -137) His 
presentation makes it clear that it's very much a modern world, 
meaning that its features are young. Given Eskridge's analysis, 
the poles described above could not have existed a little more 
than a century ago. It is unlikely that a man of 1865 would have 
beaten his dog for being "homosexual," since the word and per-
haps the concept did not exist at the time. 9 It is more unlikely 
object while shouting, ··God will punish you for your lifestyle'" and ··You can't be gay'" 
After being rushed to the emergency room and treated for multiple wdts on his body, 
the young man survived. The parents were charged in the beating. New York Daily 
News (Aug. 13, 2000). available at WI\'1\'.IIVdail\nfln.com. Following the theme of link-
ing dogs and gays. a city in Mexico recently prohibited '"dogs and homosexuals" from 
having access to its beaches. "Dogs and Homosexuals arc Barred from Entering Beach 
Area:· La Jornada (Aug. 25, 2000), <hllp.jornada.unam.mx/indcx.htmb. 
6. Baker 1·. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Yt. 1'1'1'1). 
7. Sec 15 V.S.A. s 1204 (2000), available in LEXIS, "Vermont Statutes Anno-
tated" Database. 
8. The distinction will not last long. Effective in 20(Jl, the Netherlands will recog-
nize full-tlcdged same-sex marriages. "Dutch Legislators Approve Full Marriage Rights 
for Gays," N.Y. Times A4 (Sept. 13, 2000). 
9. However, there might have been other terms meaning something similar to ho-
mosexual; there were certainly people engaging in same-sex acts before the introduction 
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that a state in that year would have fully sanctioned an intimate 
relationship between two people of the same sex. Though not 
much of Eskridge's presentation of the history of American 
law's treatment of gays draws from original research, its synthe-
sis of the available secondary sources is a useful contribution and 
will likely become a staple of classes treating the subject. 
The larger part of Gaylaw is an argument for moving the 
continents, or perhaps for reshaping them. This is the book's 
greatest challenge and the place where Gaylaw will draw the 
most fire. Eskridge offers some fairly standard but nonetheless 
powerfully-reasoned arguments that the right of privacy should 
be applied to protect individuals from criminal sanction for con-
sensual sodomy. (pp. 152-73) He makes an intriguing but in-
complete case that state criminal prohibitions on sodomy run 
afoul of the First Amendment. (pp. 176-202) On Eskridge's 
view, the Equal Protection Clause should invalidate a wide range 
of laws discriminating against homosexuals. (pp. 207-31) Fi-
nally, he urges that the similarities between religion and homo-
sexuality should lead to greater constitutional solicitude for the 
latter. (pp. 296-302) 
In the process, Gaylaw leads readers on a tour of the famil-
iar battlefields of the culture war: rape, employment discrimina-
tion, obscenity, adultery, prostitution, pornography, sado-
masochism, intergenerational sex (pedophilia and pederasty), 
polygamy, maternal surrogacy contracts, and public sex. It's all 
there. 
The theoretical goal for Eskridge is to craft an approach to 
constitutional and policy issues that borrows heavily from femi-
nism but is marginally distinct from it in outcomes and rationale. 
This approach, which Eskridge calls "gaylaw," differs from what 
Eskridge calls "regulatory feminism" chiefly in its deep, across-
the-board distrust of state sexual regulation. Thus, gaylaw criti-
cizes prohibitions on prostitution, sado-masochism, pornogra-
phy, and some intergenerational sex that regulatory feminism 
supports. It is, with a slightly libertarian twist, the dominant ap-
proach in gay-sympathetic legal scholarship. Gaylaw is pro-sex 
feminism. 
At the same time, gaylaw sees state regulation of sexuality, 
including the resultant creation of a closet into which gays re-
of the word homosexual (and those acts, in America and in Europe, were often socially 
and legally disapproved); and there were people prior to the 19th century who seem to 
have had a primary erotic orientation to others of the same sex. 
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treat, through the feminist prism of gender. Eskridge undoubt-
edly believes that approach is amply justified by, among other 
things, the history he recites. He views anti-gay prejudice as in-
distinguishable from sex discrimination both doctrinally and 
theoretically because the two prejudices are linked. He concep-
tualizes sexual nonconformity as a species of gender noncon-
formity. 
There are clear doctrinal advantages to the sexual-
nonconformity-is-gender-nonconformity model. If discrimina-
tion by government, as in the marriage laws and in laws forbid-
ding same-sex sodomy, is sex discrimination then it is subject to 
heightened scrutiny and probable invalidation across a broad 
range. Further, statutes prohibiting private sex discrimination 
(in employment, for example) should be interpreted to prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination as well. (pp. 231-33) 
The model also has undeniable factual and historical reso-
nance. Traditional views about the place of men and women in 
society have certainly fed anti-gay sentiment. Scratch a sexist 
and you almost always find a homophobe, and vice versa. 
But the model proves too much and accomplishes too little. 
It overemphasizes the undeniable overlap between sexual rebel-
lion and gender rebellion, including the state's past attempts to 
suppress them both. That overemphasis misunderstands gay life 
because it reduces it to one part. It misses the constitutive role 
law plays in gender rebellion. It allows the opponents of gay 
equality to set the terms of the debate. And it fails fully to ac-
count for and to engage the many non-sexist arguments now ad-
vanced against gay equality. The gain-allowing gays to share 
with feminists an identity of gender oppression-may not be 
worth the pain. 
Gaylaw is an admirable attempt to liberate us-gay and 
straight-from what Eskridge calls in the book's subtitle, "The 
Apartheid of the Closet." Yet it turns out that in subtle and un-
intentional ways Gaylaw manages to liberate from a closet what 
it then confines to a prison. It is an "identity prison", to borrow 
Eskridge's useful phrase, (p. 7) one that has the virtue of being 
roomier than the old closet but the vice of being another con-
finement. 
Nevertheless, Gaylaw is a clear and soberly written10 argu-
ment, a powerful accomplishment that both reflects and rein-
10. A lone exception is Eskridge's brief flirtation with vegetation similes. We en-
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forces what have become some of the principal approaches to le-
gal scholarship in the area.'' It manages to connect contempo-
rary discrimination against gays with the extensive historical re-
cord of such discrimination. And it envisions a moral dimension 
to gay equality that is both provocative and refreshing. For 
those reasons alone, it cannot be ignored. 
I. GAYLAW'S HISTORY 
"The modern regulatory state cut its teeth on gay people," 
Eskridge writes. (p. 43) Gaylaw chronicles, in detailed fashion, 
the often cruel ways in which it did so. More than just a tale of 
woe, however, Gaylaw also shows how the decentralized struc-
ture of American government and the country's libertarian lean-
ings undermined the campaign to repress homosexuals. 
A. MUNICIPAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL REGULATION: 
1880-1946 
Eskridge begins his history of the legal regulation of same-
sex intimacy in America with the period after 1880. On the one 
hand, this seems an odd starting point since many states had laws 
prohibiting "crimes against nature," "sodomy," and "buggery" 
well before that time, as Gaylaw's useful Appendix A1 demon-
strates. (pp. 328-37) (listing dates of first sodomy laws for each 
state, starting in 1610) There is a history of the pre-Civil War in-
teraction of law and "sodomitical sin," 12 but only brief references 
to it can be found in Gaylaw. 
On the other hand, the pre-Civil War laws were vague and 
there seems to have been little public concern about them, much 
less a concerted effort to enforce them. New York City, for ex-
ample, prosecuted a mere twenty-two sodomy cases between 
1796 and 1873. By 1900, the city prosecuted more than twice 
that number every year. (p. 25) Even accounting for population 
increases, that's a dramatic rise. 
dure three of them in the space of five pages ("gay bars and baths proliferated like mush-
rooms after a spring rain," (p. 113}, '"gay college groups grew like wildflowers," (p. 116), 
and "gay literature nourished like azaleas in April" (p. 118) before they disappear like 
dead leaves in the first winter snow). 
II. For a classic statement of the link between the violation of sexual norms and the 
violation of gender norms, sec Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of 
Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187. 
12. See, e.g., Jonathan Ned Katz, Gay/Lesbian Almanac 23-133 (Carroll & Graf 
Pub., 1994) (collecting original source materials for the period 1607-1740, including stat-
utes, cases, and first-hand accounts). 
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Moreover, prior to the Civil War, the law concentrated on 
prohibiting acts without conceiving the people who committed 
them as a type of person. An analogue today might be handed-
ness. We know people who are left-handed, deviating from the 
mathematical norm of right-handedness, but we do not have a 
word for "left-handed people," 13 do not see them as having a 
separate identity based on handedness, and do not attach any le-
gal, social, or moral significance to their deviant dexterity. 
After the Civil War, the country became increasingly indus-
trialized and, with that, urbanized. Large numbers of people 
moved to cities from small towns and rural areas. Cities, in turn, 
offered relative anonymity and separation from extended fami-
lies. At the same time, large cities at once brought together 
people with varying sexual desires and offered more opportunity 
to satisfy them. By 1881, sexual subcultures existed in New York 
City, San Francisco, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, 
New Orleans, and Washington, D.C. (pp. 20-21) 
According to Eskridge, the "most significant feature" of the 
burgeoning sexual subcultures of the late 19th century was "a 
conscious interconnection of cross-gender dress and sexual de-
sires." (p. 21) Some women dressed as men and married other 
women, taking on male sexual and professional roles. A striking 
example is that of Elvira Mugarietta, a biological female, who 
passed as male between 1892 and 1936, enabling her to serve in 
professional capacities largely closed to women, including the 
military, journalism, and philanthropy. Alice Mitchell, "a Mem-
phis belle," proposed to marry another woman by passing as a 
man. (p. 17) Men, too, cross-dressed and attracted male sexual 
partners. Effeminate males known as "fairies" sought out sol-
diers and working-class men willing to receive oral sex or give 
anal sex. (p. 22) 
Reacting to the growth of these subcultures, cities and states 
began regulating sexuality as never before. Although the sod-
omy laws extant in every state during the period played a role in 
this repression, they were not the main tool. Eskridge identifies 
four primary categories of early state and municipal laws in-
tended to constrain deviance: laws against cross-dressing-
publicly wearing garb traditionally associated with the opposite 
sex; laws against public indecency and sexual solicitation, includ-
13. "Southpaw" might qualify but it is used to describe left-handed baseball pitch-
ers rather than to describe left-handed people generally. 
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ing laws against "disorderly conduct" and "lewd vagrancy"; child 
molestation laws; and obscenity laws. (pp. 27-34) 
It is noteworthy that the first category (laws against cross-
dressing) regulated gender nonconformity regardless of whether 
it was accompanied by sexual deviance. The latter three catego-
ries (public indecency, child molestation, and obscenity), to-
gether with sodomy laws, regulated sexual nonconformity re-
gardless of whether it was accompanied by other markers of 
gender nonconformity. The law's concern about these activities 
may have sprung from similar roots, but they were not the same 
weeds. Indeed, as Eskridge writes, "[ d]uring this period the law 
began seriously to focus on homosexuals as a regulatory class 
apart from other gender-benders." (p. 54) (emphasis added) 
Enforcement of the laws against cross-dressing appears to 
have been sporadic, suggesting less state concern for sartorial 
gender-bending than for sexual deviance. Gaylaw provides al-
most no arrest or prosecution data for violations of the cross-
dressing laws. This contrasts with Eskridge's detailed and valu-
able presentation of data for arrests and prosecutions for sex-
related offenses in several American cities. (Appendices C1-C6) 
In St. Louis, the one city for which cross-dressing arrest data are 
supplied, arrests were rare, especially compared to arrests for 
sex-related offenses. There were none after 1922. (Appendix 
C4) There were, however, repeated incidents of police harass-
ment of drag balls in many American cities. (p. 45) 
State and municipal laws were enforced to suppress homo-
sexual association, including groups formed to advocate liberali-
zation of sex regulations. An especially aggressive intrusion on 
free association came in 1924 against the Chicago-based Society 
for Human Rights, a small group that supported repeal of the Il-
linois sodomy law. After the wife of a member complained to 
police, they arrested the leaders of the group on disorderly-
conduct charges, confiscated the group's records, and seized one 
leader's personal diary. (pp. 44-45) Additionally, license laws 
requiring holders to be of "good character" were used both to 
prevent gay bars from opening and to shut them down when 
they slipped through the system. New York's State Liquor Au-
thority, among others, prohibited bars from serving prostitutes 
and homosexuals. (pp. 45-46, 78) 
Tougher child molestation laws were seen as an especially 
needed protection against predatory homosexuals, whom one 
610 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.17:603 
Ohio judge in 1922 memorably described as "wild ferocious 
animals." (p. 40) 
Federal authorities also took a hand in regulating sexuality 
before 1946. They did this by seizing and destroying obscene 
publications, excluding immigrants convicted of sexual crimes, 
and barring military service by degenerates. (pp. 34-37) U.S. 
Customs censored or seized novels depicting homosexuality in a 
positive way, including the 1886 edition of The Arabian Nights. 
(p. 47) Authorities censored homosexual content from films. (p. 
48) 
Some of the laws enacted during this period seem especially 
draconian by today's standards. A 1911 Massachusetts law al-
lowed the state to incarcerate degenerates and other "mental de-
fectives" for indefinite periods of time in state mental institu-
tions. More commonly, state laws called for sterilization or 
castration of moral degenerates and sexual perverts, mostly ho-
mosexuals. To "treat" homosexuals, hospitals performed pre-
frontal lobotomies, injected massive doses of male hormones, 
and administered electric shock and other aversion therapy. (p. 
42) None of it worked: homosexuality survived. 
B. ANTI-GAY REGULATION AND THE GAY REACfiON: 
1946-PRESENT 
Immediately following World War II, American govern-
ment and society became increasingly alarmed by the spread of 
Communism. This was also a period of what Eskridge calls "a 
national antihomosexual Kulturkampf." (p. 59) Between 1946 
and 1961 alone, when arrests for violation of sodomy laws 
reached historic highs, the state "imposed criminal punishments 
on as many as a million lesbians and gay men engaged in consen-
sual adult intercourse, dancing, kissing, or holding hands." (p. 
60) 
Officials often worried that homosexuals, like Communists, 
were infiltrating and undermining government agencies. The 
"sexual perverts," warned one politico, were just as "dangerous 
as the actual Communists." (p. 68) In the space of seven 
months in 1950, President Harry Truman's administration inves-
tigated the alleged sexual perversion of 382 civil servants, most 
of whom subsequently resigned. A government report warned 
that "[ o ]ne homosexual can pollute an entire office." In fact, 
more State Department employees were fired for homosexuality 
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than for Communist sympathies in 1951 and 1952, the height of 
McCarthy-era red-hunting. (p. 69) 
Immigration law reflected the concurrent national security 
concern with political and sexual subversives. The McCarran-
Walter Act of 1952 excluded Communists, anarchists, and "per-
sons ... who are homosexuals or sex perverts." The federal in-
vestigations continued into the administration of Dwight Eisen-
hower. (pp. 69-71) The FBI kept close watch over homosexual 
political groups and federal authorities censored or confiscated 
homosexual publications. (pp. 74-78) 
At the same time, states cracked down on homosexuals. 
They used professional licensing laws to prevent homosexuals 
from becoming doctors, dentists, pharmacists, embalmers, 
guardians, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals. (pp. 72-
74) Many states removed "public place" requirements from 
their lewdness or indecency statutes, meaning that not only pri-
vate gay sex was prohibited but that even proposing such private 
conduct was illegal. (p. 62) Law enforcement authorities ag-
gressively used police stakeouts at suspected gay bars, decoy op-
erations, and police raids to arrest large numbers of socializing 
homosexuals. For example, a 1960 raid on a San Francisco bar 
resulted in the disorderly-conduct arrests of 103 people for 
same-sex dancing. (pp. 63-64) Remarkably, when a serial killer 
targeted homosexuals in Santa Monica in 1956, police used de-
tails of the killer's confession to start an anti-gay cleanup of the 
city. (p. 65) 
States and municipalities intensified their campaign to close 
gay bars through business and liquor license schemes. (pp. 78-
80) A 1954 Miami ordinance, for example, made it illegal for a 
bar owner "to knowingly allow two or more persons who are 
homosexuals, lesbians or perverts to congregate or remain in his 
place of business." This one-homo-per-bar rule resulted in the 
closing of all of Miami's gay bars by the late 1950s. (p. 79) 
Gays reacted to this crusade by invoking, with some success, 
substantive and procedural privacy protections. (pp. 83-92) Yet 
this strategy offered limited solace because "homosexuals would 
be let alone [only] so long as they acknowledged the shameful-
ness of sexual and gender deviation." (p. 92) They could hide in 
the closet, concealing their orientation from a state partly 
stripped of the power to pursue them there, but they could not 
safely "come out." 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, with the help of Warren Court juris-
prudence and the legal victories of the black civil rights move-
ment, conditions improved. Increasingly robust criminal proce-
dure rights decreased the success rate and increased the costs of 
anti-gay prosecutions. (pp. 101-04) Due process policies of fair 
notice and anti-vagueness helped strike down some lewdness 
and sexual solicitation laws, as well as episodically-enforced laws 
against cross-dressing. (pp. 108-11) Litigants successfully used 
the First Amendment's freedom of association to open gay bars 
and to form gay organizations, churches, and school clubs. (pp. 
112-16) Free speech and free press guarantees allowed gay lit-
erature and newspapers to flourish. (pp. 116-25) 
However, Eskridge perceptively observes that some legal 
advances were less important than political gains. Procedural 
guarantees for those accused of sex crimes did not reduce actual 
arrest rates until an increase in gay political power "forced police 
departments to consider their interests." (p. 104) Sodomy laws 
fell in state after state before 1978, usually by legislative rather 
than by judicial action. (p. 106) 
Another useful insight from Gaylaw is that gay advocates 
were able to invoke the idea of legal neutrality to "appeal to an 
antigay judiciary to protect private gay spaces and the territory 
of gay sub-culture." (p. 100) The precepts of American law, 
many of them with historic and traditional roots in the nation's 
founding and in English common law, were applied to protect 
members of a newly-recognized and unpopular group. 
Eskridge briefly recounts what many regard as a defining 
moment in the history of the gay civil rights movement, the riot 
that erupted after police raided a New York gay bar, the Stone-
wall Inn, in 1969. His description of the riot as an uprising of 
"drag queens, butch lesbians, and fairies" resonates with his be-
lief in the link between sexual and gender rebellion. But, as his-
tory, the description is partial. Contrary to popular mythology, 
the clientele of the Stonewall comprised largely middle-class 
white men. Very few drag queens, gay women, or nonwhites 
were even admitted to the bar. 14 Of course, this observation 
does not deny that gender-benders were present at the riot. It 
\4. Stephen 0. Murray, American Gay 59 n.\40 (U. of Chicago Press, 1996). A fa-
mous drag queen who was present that night has also debunked the notion that the 
Stonewall Inn was a "bar for drag queens.'' Eric Marcus, Making History: The Struggle 
for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights, 1945-90 at 190-91 (Harper Collins, 1992) (account 
from Rey "Sylvia Lee" Rivera). 
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only makes the point that their centrality to it has been exagger-
ated, perhaps for political or ideological reasons. 
Despite all their gains through the late 1990s, including the 
passage of employment non-discrimination ordinances in several 
states and scores of municipalities, "gay people remain second-
class citizens in the United States." Homosexuals are prohibited 
from marrying each other, considered criminal under the sod-
omy laws of nineteen states (six of which are directed solely at 
gay sex), discriminated against in child-custody and adoption 
proceedings, barred from service in the military, and legally un-
protected from private employment discrimination in most of 
the country. (pp. 139-40) Ending that secol].d-class status is the 
constitutional and policy project of Gaylaw. 1' 
II. GAYLAW'S PREMISE 
Before considering Eskridge's constitutional and policy ar-
guments, a preliminary issue must be addressed. Underlying the 
history and argument of Gaylaw is a fundamental premise: sex-
ual nonconformity is gender nonconformity (the "gender prem-
ise"). The gender premise has profound consequences for the 
way we should think about gay life and the law. Because it is 
behind Eskridge's theoretical and some of his constitutional ap-
proach, it's critical both to understand the gender premise and to 
assess its merits. 
Eskridge believes "there is a historical as well as logical 
connection between compulsory gender binarism, the idea that 
men must be masculine and women must be feminine, and com-
pulsory heterosexuality, the idea that sexuality must consist of a 
man having sex with a woman." (p. 224) (emphasis original) 
This observation is the basis for his doctrinal argument that anti-
gay discrimination is a form of sex discrimination subject to 
heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. (pp. 
218-28) In short, "issues of sexual nonconformity should not be 
separated from issues of gender nonconformity." (p. 1) 16 On the 
history and logic presented, is he right? 
The gender premise has three functions for Eskridge. It of-
fers an historical explanation of the social and legal link between 
15. Sec Part III infra. 
16. Indeed, Eskridge "uses the term 'gay people' to include both sexual orientation 
minorities-lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals-and transgendercd people-transsexuals 
and transvestites." (p. 1) This is the path taken in William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Nan D. 
Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law (Foundation Press, 1997). 
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gender and sexual deviance. It is descriptive of gay life: homo-
sexuals are gender rebels and the resistance they meet can be 
understood as a reaction to that fact. And it has legal implica-
tions in its attempt to link sexual orientation discrimination to 
sex discrimination. I consider each of these functions below. 
A. THE HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF THE GENDER PREMISE 
At first blush, the gender premise seems historically justi-
fied by the observed behavior of the sexual nonconformists. Re-
call Eskridge's discussion of the perceived connection between 
cross-gender dress and same-sex sexual desires in the early sex-
ual subcultures of many American cities. 17 These sexual subcul-
tures included women, like Elvira Mugarietta and Alice 
Mitchell, who dressed and behaved like men and were attracted 
to other women. The subcultures also included effeminate 
males- "fairies," to use the word of the time- who sought other 
men for sex. (p. 22) 
The gender premise also seems justified by the historical 
obsessions of governmental authorities. There are numerous ac-
counts-drawn from police records, professional "sexologists" 
and other medical observers-describing the early sexual subcul-
tures and the people who comprised them. One 1889 account by 
a doctor described the "colony of male sexual perverts" in Chi-
cago who had both "abnormal sexual impulses" and "effeminacy 
of voice, dress, and manner." Female impersonators and fairies 
frequented the periodic drag balls and burlesques that became 
popular in the 1890s. (p. 21-23) 
In a preview of the gender premise, medical and mental 
health professionals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries be-
gan to see a connection between same-sex sexual activity and 
gender-bending behavior. They also began to see both as a 
sickness. They developed elaborate and, to modern ears, bizarre 
theories to explain the new phenomena of widespread sexual 
and gender nonconformity. These theories generated a special-
ized medical vocabulary. Early sexologists studied what they 
called "inverts," people who rejected both their appropriate 
sexual and gender roles. The invert's body and mind took on 
traits associated with the opposite sex. Feminized males or mas-
culinized females were a "degeneration," a reversion to an ear-
lier evolutionary status. One doctor wrote in 1884 that when 
17. See Part I.A. supra. 
2000] LIMITS OF GA YLA W 615 
people's "sex is perverted ... men become women and women 
men, in their tastes, conduct, character, feelings and behavior." 
(p. 22) 
An early theorist who bravely opposed criminal sodomy 
laws was German attorney Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, himself an in-
vert, who wrote: "That an actual man would feel sexual love for 
a man is impossible. The urning [Ulrich's term for an invert] is 
not a true man. He is a mixture of man and woman. He is man 
only in terms of body build. "18 Eskridge does not quote this pas-
sage, but it is the clearest early statement from a gay-
sympathetic source of the notion that gays are natural gender 
rebels. There are echoes of the urnings theory in the modern 
equation of sexual and gender nonconformity. 
By 1921 the Army defined the nervous condition of "degen-
eration" as "often marked by diminished stature and inferior 
vigor; males may present the general body conformation of the 
opposite sex." To the military, "sexual perversion" was not sim-
ply an act but often a medical condition. And it was clearly 
linked to gender-bending. (p. 37) 
It's difficult, from across a century, to know precisely what 
significance to draw from the reported behavior and dress of the 
early gender-benders. Many of the accounts of their lives come 
from those- the police and medical authorities- pre-disposed 
both to disapprove them and to see them as necessarily a threat 
to traditional gender roles. For the lawmaker, the law enforcer, 
and the medical observer of the late 19th and early 20th century, 
same-sex sexual behavior could only be the act of an invert. It 
could not be the act of a normal person. 
It should not be surprising that such authorities linked sex-
ual and gender nonconformity. Gender deviance is observable; 
homosexuality is not. Gender deviants were the deviants such 
authorities could see and study. The sexual deviants who were 
not otherwise gender-bending, on the other hand, were harder to 
find. Moreover, it's plainly true that same-sex sexual desire and 
behavior do not conform to one basic and important traditional 
gender expectation: a person should be sexually attracted to the 
opposite sex. 
18. Karl Heinrich Ulrichs. Araxes (!870) (quoted in Mark Blasius and Shane 
Phelan, eds., We Are Everywhere: A Hisrorica/ Sourcebook of Gay and Lesbian Policies 
63,64 (Routledge, 1997)). 
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It should also not be surprising that some inverts behaved in 
gender nonconforming ways (apart from their same-sex sexual 
activity) by, for example, taking on the dress associated with the 
opposite sex. Eskridge recounts this behavior but offers no the-
ory to explain it, except perhaps the gender premise itself. 
One explanation of gender nonconformity among inverts 
100 years ago, and among gays today, is that there is a necessary 
connection between gender and sexual rebellion. To give up the 
traditional sex role by being homosexual, according to this ex-
planation, is to surrender to gender rebellion across a broad 
front of manner, dress, and behavior. 
An alternative explanation is that gender nonconformity 
among inverts, and among modern gays, is partly an artifact of 
social stigma and legal repression. This is evident in three ways. 
First, gender nonconformity is a way for some people to ac-
cess advantages and attract mates available only to the opposite 
sex while escaping detection from legal, familial, and social ob-
servers. Perhaps, as the sexual-nonconformity-is-gender-
nonconformity model suggests, women like Mugarietta cross-
dressed because they were truly uncomfortable with the gender 
(feminine) assigned to them by tradition because of their sex 
(female). On the other hand, perhaps some of these women did 
it because in late 19th and early 20th century America, that was 
the only practical way for a woman to become a soldier, journal-
ist, and philanthropist. Maybe women like Mitchell thought of 
passing as a man because they rejected socially-assigned gender 
roles. Or perhaps, on the other hand, they did it because under 
the constraints of the time a gender-bending act would enable a 
woman to marry the person she loved- another woman. 
Second, as Eskridge recognizes, an atmosphere where ac-
knowledged homosexual desire is penalized and stigmatized re-
sults in the creation of the closet as "a suffocating situs of sexual 
secrecy." (p. 56) Homosexuals hide to avoid anti-gay social and 
legal disabilities. In such a climate, a degree of gender noncon-
formity acts as a relatively safe signaling device to identify other 
homosexuals. It is a way for gays to find each other, even as they 
hide in the closet, while reducing the risk of discovery by those 
who would disapprove. This signaling might take a variety of 
forms: particular words given a special meaning in the subcul-
ture,19 a particular mannerism, an article of clothing, etc. Since 
19. In an earlier era, it was common for a gay person to call another gay person a 
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experienced inverts and authorities were taught by science and 
medicine to associate sexual deviance with gender role confu-
sion, gender nonconformity would have seemed a natural way 
for closeted inverts to send signals to one another without tip-
ping off uninitiated friends, co-workers, and family members. 
Third, for gay males in an era when femininity was identi-
fied with inferiority, behaving in a gender nonconforming man-
ner helped reassure their sexual partners that they retained their 
masculinity even though they were having male-male sex. Since, 
under a traditional understanding an "actual man" could not feel 
sexual desire for another actual man, it helped if one played a 
more traditionally feminine role in dress, manner, language, and 
sexual position. Thus, as Eskridge reports, fairies took on the 
passive or receptive role associated with femininity when having 
sex with traditionally masculine men. 
A 1919 investigation of naval facilities in Newport, Rhode 
Island, for example, uncovered a group of fairies who fellated 
sailors. The fairies took on women's names, dressed as women, 
walked and minced in girlish ways, hugged each other, and 
played the woman's part in sex. (p. 36) They were classic gen-
der benders. For the sailors and even for the authorities investi-
gating Newport, oral sex with fairies was not "morally problem-
atic so long as [the sailors] were playing the man's part, the 
inserter, and the degenerate was playing the woman's part, the 
insertee." (p. 38) This reasoning allowed the dominant or inser-
tive partner to retain his status as "straight" and hence normal. 
Did the fairies behave as they did because they were un-
comfortable with rigid gender roles or, rather, because they 
wanted sex with men and being feminine was the way to get it? 
It's hard to say with certainty, but for many fairies gender-
bending may well have been a means and not an end. These 
men wanted sex, not a gender rebellion. 
In each of these ways some degree of gender nonconform-
ity, whether it takes a minimal or maximal form, could be under-
stood as a rational response to social and legal repression.]0 It is 
·•friend of Dorothy,"" n.:fcrring to Judy Garland's character in The Wizard of Oz. 
20. I do not claim here that, in the ahs..:nce of social and legal repression, there 
would he less gender nonconformity among gays than among straights. See Richard 
Posner, Sex and Reason 301 (Harvard U. Press, 1992) (greater incidence of childhood 
gender nonconformity among gay men "makes it plausible to expect that effeminacy 
would he more common among homosexual than among heterosexual adults" even ab-
sent repn.:ssion). My only claim here is that the incidence of such nonconformity would 
likely not be as great at lower levels of such repression. At the very least, repression 
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a way of acting to maximize the availability of things one desires. 
On this view, gender nonconformity among the inverts of yester-
year or the gays of today is socially constructed-at least as 
much as are traditional gender roles or the concept of homo-
sexuality itself. 21 Consider that in ancient Greece male-to-male 
sexual activity was an integral part of masculinity, not a threat to 
it. 22 The conception of same-sex desire as necessarily gender-
bending is conventional, not natural. 
More than that, ironically perhaps, gender nonconformity 
among gays may be socially induced. In the ways described 
above, it is a product of the very homophobia gaylaw seeks to 
eliminate. Rather than being a sign of freedom it is a mark of 
imprisonment. Once generated, it is mimicked by others in the 
gay subculture as a way to connect with and to maintain a com-
munal identity.23 Young gays learn gender nonconformity from 
other gays.24 Gender insubordination is an imitation for which 
there is no original.25 
Eskridge generally recognizes law's role in shaping behavior 
and desire in unexpected ways. In an especially insightful pas-
sage, he writes, 
A leading heterofear is that gays in the military, same-sex 
marriage, and gay families with children would unleash weird-
ness upon the country. Greater weirdness has been built up 
by state campaigns against gay people, for such campaigns 
drive people away from mainstream values and create 
unproductive anger, as well as empower society's worst big-
ots. (p. 10) 
causes both homosexuals and heterosexuals "to exaggerate the percentage of [male] ho-
mosexuals who arc effeminate." !d. at 301-02. 
21. I leave to one side the question whether social constructionism is generally a 
useful or accurate way to look at the world. 
22. Sec generally Byrne Fone, Homophobia: A History 25 (Metropolitan Books, 
2000) ("For the Greeks, warrior, citizen, husband, and lover of boys were all fruits of 
masculine identity.") 
23. Eskridge notes that "[t]he law helped engender a group identity among gay 
people both by persecuting them as gays and by protecting gay public expression." (p. 
92) (emphasis original) It is the gender-nonconforming aspects of that group identity I 
point to here. 
24. Paula Martinac, Learning 'Cultural Queerness,' Bay Area Reporter 10 (Aug. 17, 
2000) (describing how she "'learned' lesbianism from my friends and lovers," as a result 
of which "I ... cut my hair short, and put on men's jeans and shirts"). 
25. Compare Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in Diana Fuss, 
ed., Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories 13 (Routledge, 1991) ("gender ts a kmd 
of imitation for which there is no original. ... "). 
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For example, he writes, "by teaching thugs that they could 
have their way with fairies without accountability, the law en-
couraged their sadism; by teaching fairies that they were subhu-
man, the law inculcated in some of them a victim mentality of 
masochism." (p. 54) Thus, on Eskridge's account, law uninten-
tionally creates sado-masochistic subculture. 
I doubt that gay sado-masochistic subculture is entirely a 
product of the legal repression of homosexuals. But the struc-
ture of Eskridge's argument here is noteworthy because he does 
not apply the same insight to gender rebellion. It could be that 
the legal and social equation of sexual and gender nonconform-
ity, including the punishment of both, has played a constitutive 
and causal role in gender-bending among some gays. It's a 
proposition worth considering, but it can't be found in the pages 
of Gaylaw. Instead, Eskridge uncritically accepts the notion ad-
vanced by many feminists and by those who advocate the legal 
and social repression of homosexuality: that gays share some sort 
of "rejection of gender role." (p. 55) 
B. THE DESCRIPTIVE FUNCTION OF THE GENDER PREMISE 
Another function of the gender premise is to describe both 
gay life and the source of the obstacles gays face. Gays just are 
gender rebels, it asserts. Moreover, their troubles are deeply 
connected to traditional views about the proper roles of men and 
women. 
The gender premise is descriptively reductionist, and over-
stated, in its equation of sexual nonconformity and gender rebel-
lion. As the model insists, gays reject at least one traditional 
gender characteristic by virtue of their same-sex erotic attrac-
tion. But does this mean they reject "gender role" as a general 
matter? 
Suppose there are a hundred qualities packed into the tradi-
tional notion of what it is to be a masculine male. 26 These quali-
ties might include everything from general traits, like aggres-
siveness, to specific ones, like watching televised sports. One of 
them-and surely a very important one-is desiring women for 
sex. Gay men, by definition, reject that trait. But a riotous act is 
26. The idea that there is a single traditional notion of what it is to be a masculine 
male or a feminine female, or that such conceptions have been stahle over time, is douht-
ful. Although there are some widely-shared views about what constitutes masculine and 
feminine qualities, there is no unanimity ahout them and, hecausc they are conventional, 
they arc changeable. 
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not a revolution. Many gay men accept most or all of the other 
ninety-nine hypothetical traits of masculinity; and many gay 
women, femininity. 
For example, it's quite possible (even common) for a gay 
male to embrace the traditional masculine belief in the superior-
ity of men to women. By his erotic attachment to other men, 
and his erotic rejection of women, he might be thought to em-
brace masculinity more emphatically than do heterosexual 
males. Far from being a gender nonconformist by virtue of his 
sexual deviance, he might be a gender superconformist. He's not 
a gender rebel, but a gender patriot. Some lesbian feminists 
have bitterly made this point about gay men, with one labeling 
gay rights "the fundamentalism of the global religion which is 
Patriarchy. "27 
An advantage of linking gender and sexual nonconformity 
might be that destabilizing strict gender roles will undermine 
traditional male-female sexual expectations, liberating homo-
sexuals. (pp. 224-26) A society unconcerned with policing gender 
will likely be less interested in policing gay sexuality. But this 
victory, if ever achieved, is not absolute. There are good reasons 
for policing some expressions of sexuality (e.g., bestiality, incest, 
pedophilia, prostitution, and rape) that have little or nothing to 
do with the enforcement of rigid gender roles. Similarly, there 
are reasons often offered for policing gay sex (e.g., protecting 
children from sexual predation, preventing the spread of disease, 
and discouraging the modeling of an inherently unhappy life-
style) that also have little or nothing to do with the enforcement 
of rigid gender roles. Eskridge recognizes that modern anti-gay 
rationales are shifting away from explicitly sexist appeals. (pp. 
226-27) Linking gender and sexual nonconformity is, at best, an 
incomplete way to attack anti-gay impulses, leaving untouched 
much of today's homophobic terrain. The gender premise seems 
increasingly like an attempt to fight the present war with the 
weapons and strategies successful in the last. As a tool of legal 
and cultural criticism, it is becoming anachronistic. 
It is certainly true that opponents of gay legal equality have 
historically tended to fuse homosexuality and gender noncon-
formity, although as noted above that form of anti-gay argument 
27. Marilvn Frye, Lesbian Feminism and the Gay Rights Movemelll: Another View 
of Male Supre~acy, ·Another Separatism (1981 ), in We Are Everywhere 499, 501-03 (cited 
in note 18) (asserting that gay men's effeminacy, rather than signifying an "identification 
with women or the womanly," is "a casual and cynical mockery of women"). 
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is waning. Thus, the gender premise might be defended as a 
practical response to the opposition, treating the symptom of 
homophobia by curing the disease of sexism. Yet, as Eskridge 
shows, gay-equality opponents have equated homosexuality with 
everything from pedophilia to communism.28 No one thinks, for 
that reason, we should paint gays as natural child molesters. No 
one supposes gays have a shared rejection of capitalism.29 It's a 
strange path to liberation that takes the opposition's stereotype 
(gays are gender rebels) as a starting point. A more successful 
legal and cultural strategy might be to dislodge the stereotype 
root and branch, not feed its growth. 
To the extent gender rebellion is a worthwhile gay cause at 
all, it would seem the most subversive homosexual matches are 
(1) a masculine man loving a masculine man, and (2) a feminine 
woman loving a feminine woman. These combinations upset 
traditional gender expectations in a way that general gender 
nonconformity by gays does not. The traditionalist expects a gay 
man to be effeminate and a gay woman to be butch. It's when 
gays do not conform to this nonconformity model that the tradi-
tionalist is most discomfited.30 After all, recall that on the tradi-
tional view it is literally impossible for an actual man to feel sex-
ual love for another man. Traditionalists and feminists thus 
agree: gays necessarily reject their appropriate gender role. The 
former laments this rebellion; the latter embraces and celebrates 
it. 
Theory aside, the fact is many gay women and men see 
themselves in gender-conforming terms and seek gender-
conforming traits in their mates. They do not see dismantling 
28. Sec Parts I.A. and I.B. supra. 
29. Actually, it's not quite true that no one thinks this. Kay Lahuscn, who worked 
in the pre-Stonewall homophile movement and labored to have the American Psychiatric 
Association remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders, remembers how 
some activists in the 1970s constantly tried "to make the good case for how great it would 
be under socialism and how our cause was really an economic cause." Marcus, Making 
His10ry at 214 (cited in note 14) (emphasis added). Now come feminists to claim that gay 
equality is really about gender. Someone, it seems, is always trying to claim that gay 
equality is about something other than homosexuality. 
30. In contrast to the social science research emphasizing a possible link between 
homophobia and traditional attitudes about women's place in society, (p. 224) some re-
search has found greater hatred and fear of gays who can pass in straight settings than of 
gender-nonconforming gays. See Mary Riege Laner and Roy H. Lancr, Personal Style or 
Sexual Preference: Why Gay Men are Disliked, 9 Int'l Rev. of Mod. Soc. 215, 219-27 
(1979); Mary Riege Laner and Roy H. Laner, Sexuality Preference or Personal Style? 
Why Lesbians are Disliked, 51. of Homosexuality 339, 345-53 (1980). Neither gender 
nonconformity nor sexual nonconformity alone adequately explains popular revulsion to 
homosexuals. I thank Stephm Murray for pointing me to this research. 
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gender roles as a precondition to the fulfillment of their deepest 
aspirations for love and commitment. Quite the contrary, part of 
the reason they are attracted to members of the same sex is that 
they expect their potential mates to fit expected gender roles. 
The gender premise seems inadequate to the task of explaining 
the lives and experiences of a large portion of gay women and 
men in America today. Whether the fact that many homosexu-
als conform generally to traditional gender expectations is good, 
bad, or neither is another question. But this fact at least chal-
lenges the conclusion that gays necessarily share, with each other 
and with transgendered people, a broad "rejection of gender 
role." 
C. THE LEGAL FUNCfiON OF THE GENDER PREMISE 
A final function of the gender premise is its doctrinal sug-
gestion that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination. (pp. 218-28) This argument has been developed 
in greater detail by Andrew Koppelman,31 among others. If it's 
right, sexual orientation discrimination ought to receive the 
same close scrutiny that sex discrimination receives. The legal 
argument relies in part on the historical and descriptive compo-
nents of the gender premise described above. For the same rea-
sons they are flawed it is flawed. 32 
There's more. Anti-gay prejudice is not just a means to sus-
tain patriarchy, as the gender premise implies. It has other 
sources, purposes, and effects. It might arise, for example, from 
generalized sex-negativity in American culture.33 It might also 
arise from long-standing religious doctrines. These observations 
suggest that discrimination based on sexual orientation might 
well survive the demise of sexism.34 As noted above, the state 
has plenty of justifications for discrimination against gay women 
and men that have little or nothing to do with sex discrimination. 
31. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is 
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994). 
32. See Parts II.A. and Il.B. supra. 
33. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexual-
ity, in Carole S. Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality 267, 300-09 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) (arguing that feminism's critique of gender hierarchy is 
useful but inadequate and that "an autonomous theory and politics specific to sexuality 
must be developed"). 
34. As my colleague Don Dripps points out, in recent years there has been little 
opposition to confirming women as Supreme Court Justice, Secretary of State, and At-
torney General, but it took a heroic effort to confirm a gay man (James Hormel) as am-
bassador to Luxembourg. 
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Perhaps partly for these reasons, courts have often rejected vari-
ous forms of the sex-discrimination argument when used to at-
tack private anti-gay employment discrimination under Title 
VII35 or a state's ban on same-sex marriage.36 
D. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GENDER PREMISE: THE 
PARTICULARITY THESIS 
Maybe the gender premise is unconvincing in its historical 
analysis, inaccurate as a description of gay life and the discom-
fort homosexuality causes traditionalists, and incomplete as a 
tool for the legal analysis of anti-gay discrimination, but is it all 
we have? Distinct from both traditionalism and feminism is a 
third position which holds that issues of sexual nonconformity 
and gender nonconformity share some common ground but are 
not coterminous and are thus analytically distinct. This alterna-
tive to feminism and traditionalism examines homophobia in its 
particularity, recognizing its similarities to other kinds of preju-
dice (like sexism and religious bigotry), but examining and at-
tacking its unique attributes. Call it the particularity thesis. 37 
After the publication of Gaylaw, the Vermont Supreme 
Court gave legal expression to a kind of particularity thesis in 
Baker v. Vermont, 38 the decision ending anti-gay marriage dis-
crimination in that state. There, contrary to the gender premise, 
(pp. 220-24) the court rejected an argument that the state prohi-
bition of same-sex marriage was a form of sex discrimination.39 
The court distinguished the Supreme Court's sex-discrimination 
35. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 
(9th Cir. 1979) (no Title VII claim for "discrimination on the basis of sexual prefer-
ence"). 
36. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999). But see Ba~hr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 
(Haw. 1993) (holding same-sex marriage ban violates state constitution's prohibition on 
sex discrimination). I do not urge here that the sex-discrimination argument for gay 
equality is completely unfounded or inappropriate as a way to dismantle some discrimi-
nation against gays. For example, Title VII's prohibition on "sex" discrimination might 
plausibly be applied to bar anti-gay discrimination, (pp. 231-33) though courts have so far 
rejected that view. I have argued that same-sex sexual harassment, including anti-gay 
abusive treatment, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Dale Carpen-
ter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Undu Title VII, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 699,720-26 (1996). 
37. A book review is no place to develop the particularity thesis in detail. I simply 
want to call attention to the possibility of crafting an alternative way to look at homo-
sexuality, the relationship of homosexuality to gender nonconformity, and the prejudices 
that both (pardon the word) engender. 
38. 744 A.2d 864 (1999) 
39. Id. at 880 n.13. Courts have similarly rejected the view that the prohibition on 
sex discrimination in Titk VII also prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. Sec De-
Santis, 608 F.2d at 329-30. 
624 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:603 
precedents by noting that "(a ]ll of the seminal sex-discrimination 
decisions ... have invalidated statutes that single out men or 
women as a discrete class for unequal treatment. "40 Traditional 
marriage laws are facially neutral because "each sex is equally 
prohibited from ~recisely the same conduct," marrying a person 
of the same sex. 1 To invalidate a facially neutral law, it must 
'"be traced to a discriminatory purpose."'42 But although some 
laws related to marriage may have been intended to ensure 
men's supremacy, there is no evidence "the authors of the mar-
riage laws excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect and 
discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about 
gender-role confusion."43 Instead, the court found the state's 
gay marriage ban violated the state constitution's Common 
Benefits provision, a clause with at least some similarities to the 
federal constitution's Equal Protection Clause.44 
Under a particularity thesis, many instances of anti-gay dis-
crimination might violate the Equal Protection Clause but under 
a different analysis than that which applies to a standard male-
dominance theory of sex discrimination. Unfortunately, impris-
oned by the gender premise, Gaylaw does not systematically ex-
plore the possibility of an analysis of anti-gay discrimination in-
dependent of the sex-discrimination framework. 
On the other hand, Gaylaw documents an extensive history 
of anti-gay discrimination, much of which has been independent 
40. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.l3 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,555-56 
(1996) ("repudiating statute that precluded women from attending Virginia Military In-
stitute"); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,731 (1982) ("invalidating 
admission policy that excluded males from attending state-supported nursing school"); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) ("invalidating statute that allowed women to 
purchase nonintoxicating beer at younger age than men"); Fronciero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 690 (1973) ("striking statute that imposed more onerous requirements upon 
female members of armed services to claim spouses as dependents")). 
41. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13. 
42. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 
(1979)). 
43. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13. For this reason, the court rejected a sex-
discrimination analogy to the race discrimination found by the Supreme Court to invali-
date anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where it was clear 
the law was a ruse to perpetuate white supremacy. Eskridge relies heavily on an analogy 
to Loving to argue that laws against same-sex marriage are a form of sex discrimination. 
(pp. 218-28) 
44. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886. The Baker court emphasized the differences between 
the state constitution and federal constitutions on this point, but the distinction looks 
more tactical than substantive. Relying on a formally different analysis allows the Ver-
mont court to distance itself from the federal precedents that have rejected same-sex 
marriage while at the same time employing the logic of equal protection. 
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of gender-role enforcement.45 It also presents material suggest-
ing that much present-day discrimination is at least the residue 
of anti-gay animus, an impermissible basis for legislation under 
the Equal Protection Clause.46 Thus, Gaylaw helpfully supplies 
some of the background necessary for developing a particularity 
approach. 
III. GA YLA W'S CONSTITUTION 
In the most ambitious parts of Gaylaw, Eskridge uses dif-
ferent constitutional theories and provisions to take aim at sod-
omy laws (right of privacy, First Amendment, Equal Protection), 
the ban on gay military service (First Amendment and Equal 
Protection), anti-gay child custody and adoption laws (Equal 
Protection), and state and federal bans on the recognition of gay 
marriage (Equal Protection). He also suggests a reading of the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses informed by an as-
serted similarity between religion and homosexuality. 
Although Eskridge does not lay out his constitutional 
method, a definite pattern emerges: he collects passages from 
the Supreme Court's decisions, restates them as a general princi-
ple, applies that general principle to invalidate one or another 
form of anti-gay discrimination by government, and then cites 
social science studies to reassure everyone that no real harm will 
be done. Some will take issue with this method generally, and 
others will question each of its steps as applied, but it is a coher-
ent approach that Eskridge deploys with great skill. 
A. HARDWICK GOES DOWN 
Criticizing Bowers v. Hardwick,47 the Supreme Court's deci-
sion upholding homosexual sodomy laws, is like standing in one 
of those game-show air chambers grasping at dollar bills as they 
whirl around you: there are many choices but it's hard to get a 
grip on one. Still, Eskridge makes a good case for overruling 
Hardwick, outlining four areas of vulnerability: it is inconsistent 
with Romer v. Evans, 48 the Court's decision striking down a state 
constitutional amendment repealing and prohibiting local anti-
discrimination protections for gays ("Amendment 2"); (pp. 150-
45. See Parts I.A. and I.B. supra. 
46. Sec Part III.C. infra. 
47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
48 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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51, 209-11) it is inconsistent with the Court's prior privacy juris-
prudence; (pp. 152-56) it relies on erroneous history regarding 
the content of prohibitions on sodomy at the time the 14th 
Amendment was enacted; (pp. 156-66) and it is bad policy. (pp. 
166-73) 
1. The Evans Attack 
First, Eskridge urges that Evans spells doom for Hardwick. 
Justice Scalia, in his Evans dissent, argued that it made no sense 
to permit a state to criminalize same-sex sexual behavior as the 
Court did in Hardwick, but to forbid a state from withdrawing 
legal protections for the group that engages in that very behav-
ior. According to Scalia, the greater power, to make criminals of 
gays, includes the lesser power, to deny them what he called 
"special protections. "49 Eskridge turns that argument around 
and asks, given Scalia's objection to the result in Evans, how can 
Hardwick stand? If the state can't withdraw "special protec-
tions" from gays, it surely can't make them criminals. Although 
the Evans court never mentioned Hardwick, the Seventh Circuit 
seems to agree that its days are numbered. 50 
On the other hand, Hardwick involved a criminal prohibi-
tion on specific conduct; it did not involve a sweeping denial of 
legal protections to a single class, as in Evans. Although the 
criminal law (as applied) in Hardwick focused on a single class, 
those who engage in same-sex sexual conduct, it did not with-
draw that class generally from the protection of the law. Thus, 
Scalia and Eskridge may have their "greater" and "lesser" pow-
ers backward. The state lacks the "greater" power to enact a 
sweeping denial of rights but has the "lesser" power to focus its 
prohibitory efforts on discrete areas -like the specific conduct at 
issue in Hardwick. 5 1 
Eskridge has a better argument for the vulnerability of 
Hardwick after Evans. Under Evans, a law is unconstitutional if 
its passage was motivated by sheer animosity toward the class of 
people affected. Eskridge compares this purposive failing in 
Colorado's Amendment 2 in Evans to prohibitions on same-sex 
49. !d. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
50. Sec Nabozny v. Pod/esny, 92 F.3d 446,458 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) (Hardwick "will 
soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding in Ro-
mer v. Evans"). 
51. For a syllogistic critique of Scalia's argument, see Lynn A. Baker, The Missing 
Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 387,389-99 (1997). 
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sodomy in Hardwick, noting that same-sex-only sodomy laws are 
relatively novel in American law (appearing for the first time in 
1969). (p. 210) The Hardwick court held that the moral views of 
Georgians, expressed in the sodomy law of their state, was a suf-
ficient rational basis for it. Eskridge views the enactment of such 
a moral perspective, directed at a single class of people and un-
accompanied by credible claims that the disfavored class is 
committing harm, as evincing nothing more than "popular ani-
mosity" prohibited as a justification for legislation under Evans. 
(pp. 150-51) 
This is an appealing argument both because it fits well with 
Evans and because it draws on common sensibilities in a democ-
ratic society about the danger of animus-based, non-deliberative 
factionalism. But the argument raises serious and familiar ques-
tions about how the Court is to know the purposes of a collective 
body, whether a legislature or an electorate. If a state comes 
into court saying that broad legislation targeted at a single class 
is justified by unadorned disapproval of the class, it will likely 
lose after Evans. But for that reason, a state will not make that 
argument in the context of broad, class-specific legislation. The 
state will always have other justifications, however contestable 
and pretextual, at its fingertips. 
Perhaps the answer is that judges should require a higher 
standard of support for class-specific (and certainly for status-
based) legislation that appears overly broad. But what stan-
dard? How is it to be applied? When is it triggered? Gaylaw 
doesn't say, but a consideration of the history Gaylaw presents 
might offer one possibility for deciding when a state's claimed 
justification for legislation warrants close scrutiny. The court 
might inquire whether, historically, legislation directed at the 
targeted class is more likely than not to be animus-based, or 
based on now-discredited stereotypes or once-reasonable beliefs 
clearly refuted by the advance of positive knowledge. For ex-
ample, one such discredited stereotype with respect to homo-
sexuals, refuted by the advance of positive knowledge, is that 
gays are more likely than heterosexuals to molest children. Any 
justification for legislation aimed at gays based on such a ration-
ale should not be credited. Ironically, this history-bound ap-
proach might in general be more likely to trigger distrust of vin-
tage laws, whose passage in an earlier era is more likely to have 
reflected erroneous assumptions and stereotypes about gays, 
than of recent and novel laws like Amendment 2. 
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Eskridge has presented abundant historical materials to 
raise substantial questions about the motivations behind meas-
ures like Amendment 2 and anti-gay sodomy laws, notwithstand-
ing a state's claimed justifications. (pp. 17 -137) As Eskridge 
concludes, 
[L]aws focusing on homosexuality or gay people have usually 
been motivated by hysterical, obsessional, or narcissistic and 
not public-regarding, fact-based reasoning; have repeatedly 
proven to be socially unproductive laws that either wreak pol-
icy havoc or waste state resources or (if unenforced) simply 
serve as symbolic spite measures; and focus on a class of peo-
ple subject to unjustified scorn and violence, whose unfair 
plight has typically been worsened by state brutalization and 
stigma. (p. 217) 
In short, the history of sexual regulation offers good reason 
for courts to be dubious of much legislation directed at gays 
since such legislation is more likely than not to be animus-based 
and the justifications offered for it pretextual or simply wrong. 
If Gaylaw accomplished nothing else, this insight alone would 
make it worth reading, studying, and considering in constitu-
tional litigation affecting gays. 
2. The Privacy Attack 
Second, Eskridge attacks Hardwick as inconsistent with the 
Court's prior privacy decisions. He holds that, taken together, 
those decisions establish two closely-related principles. One is 
the libertarian idea that the state should leave people alone 
unless their conduct harms others. (p. 155) The other, an "anti-
commandeering" principle, forbids the state from using "our 
bodies for its rather than our causes, absent a compelling public 
interest." (p. 155) To Eskridge, Georgia's prosecution of Hard-
wick offends both principles. 
There is a large argument over what coherent idea, if any, 
the Court's right of privacy cases establish. It's a stretch to as-
sert the Court has adopted the fourth chapter of John Stuart 
Mill's On Liberty, however normatively appealing such a consti-
tutional doctrine might be. The Court has never squarely held, 
for example, that morality alone ("nosy preferences" for 
Eskridge and Mill) cannot be the basis of legislation. 52 (Evans 
52. In other places, Eskridgc distinguishcs morality (pcrmissibk as a basis for legis-
lation) from animus (not permissible), arguing that morality is based on "traditionally 
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might be read to do that in the unusual circumstances presented 
there: a broad denial of legal protection to a specific class.) To 
the extent the Court has invalidated state regulation of sex, the 
cases have tended to be either explicitl/3 or implicitll4 in the 
context of heterosexual practice. The Court would certainly al-
low state regulation of some sexual practices (like prostitution) 
that have, at most, only indirect effects on third parties. Of 
course, it's possible to find (as Eskridge has) general language in 
the privacy opinions that, taken from context, would apply to 
protect a very wide range of human behavior from state regula-
tion. But such rhetorical arguments aren't likely to be persua-
sive to judges not already inclined to agree Hardwick should go. 
Even under Mill's harm principle, moreover, there are 
tough calls to make about when the external harm of consensual 
sexual activity is sufficient to warrant state regulation. Even for 
Eskridge, what two people do consensually in the privacy of a 
bedroom is not invariably only a matter of concern for them. He 
concedes that, in an age of AIDS, unsafe sex "reintroduces seri-
ous collective stakes in individual sex acts." (p. 259) He seems to 
agree that the Court's precedents draw the line at constitution-
ally protecting things like adultery and prostitution (though 
Eskridge doesn't ultimately think these activities should be pro-
hibited) because these activities have deleterious third-party ef-
fects. (pp. 154-55) 
Yet while adultery and prostitution have possible third-
party effects (disruption of families and the spread of venereal 
disease, among others), neither necessarily has such effects. 
Unlike rape, which is non-consensual and inherently harms the 
victim, an act of adultery is consensual for the participants and 
might be perfectly acceptable to its "victim," the non-adulterous 
spouse. While prostitution could spread venereal disease, it 
needn't do so, and it's consensual in the usual sense that word is 
used. If the privacy precedents allow such flimsy justifications 
for state intrusion on consensual sex, why would they not accept 
similarly thin explanations for same-sex sodomy bans, e.g., that 
criminalization retards the spread of HIV? On the other hand, 
public-regarding policies" whereas animus is based on "traditional antigay stereotypes 
and discourses." (p. 212) It's not clear this distinction is helpful or even meaningful as 
applied to much legislation directed at gays. Sec Part III. C. infra. 
53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting marital privacy against 
state anti-contraceptives law). 
54. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting right of unmarried couples 
to usc contraceptives). 
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Eskridge may think the claimed third-party harms of same-sex 
sodomy are even more tenuous than those for adultery and pros-
titution. If so, he's probably right. But under the Court's mean-
dering precedents, why isn't that a nice policy judgment legisla-
tures should make? 
3. The Originalist Attack 
Third, Eskridge challenges Hardwick's supposedly original-
ist result. Unlike prior privacy cases, Hardwick relied heavily on 
the argument that the activity sought to be shielded, sodomy, 
was not protected when the Fourteenth Amendment was en-
acted in 1868. Thus, the Court relied on the notion that the right 
of privacy should recognize only traditional, historically-
protected rights, not novel ones. Eskridge correctly points out 
that this rationale for bounding the right of privacy departs from 
the Court's precedents (protecting a historically-novel right to 
abortion, for example, in Roe v. Wade55 ). More than misreading 
its own precedents, however, Eskridge argues the Hardwick 
Court misunderstood the historical regulation of sodomy. Of the 
four arguments he offers against Hardwick, this one may have 
the best chance of swaying judicial conservatives. 
Although every state had "sodomy" laws (variously appear-
ing as laws against "buggery" and "crimes against nature") in 
1868, Eskridge convincingly shows that these laws were not ex-
plicitly understood to prohibit oral sex. Pennsylvania was the 
first American jurisdiction, in 1879, to define "sodomy and bug-
gery" as including oral sex. (pp. 157-61) By contrast, the distri-
bution of contraceptives and many abortions were crimes before 
or soon after the Civil War, making Hardwick's activity "a better 
case for originalist protection than either Estelle Griswold's or 
Jane Roe's conduct." (p. 164) 
It's a better case than Griswold's or Roe's but still not a 
very good one from an originalist perspective. Applying an os-
tensibly originalist analysis, Eskridge asks: Did the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment understand then-extant sodomy 
laws to prohibit oral sex? The answer, based on the history he 
supplies, should be "no." (p. 165) So Hardwick falls. 
But for an originalist that is the right answer to the wrong 
question. The better originalist question is: Would the framers 
have understood the amendment they drafted to give affirmative 
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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protection to oral sex or otherwise to disable a state from crimi-
nalizing it, given that they thought it acceptable for the state 
generally to restrict non-procreative, non-marital sex? The an-
swer to that, as Eskridge admits, is surely "no." (p. 165) So 
Hardwick stands. 
Eskridge tries to get around this inconvenient originalist an-
swer by reframing the question to account for post-adoption case 
law: If the framers could have foreseen that their amendment 
would be employed to protect the use of contraceptives and a 
right to have an abortion- a general "right to sexual privacy"-
would they have still objected to its application to consensual 
oral sex in a person's home? (p. 165) Maybe not, but that in-
quiry stacks the analytical deck by embedding relatively recent 
precedents, like Roe, that an originalist would regard as highly 
questionable. 56 
Even if Eskridge managed to persuade a principled original-
ist that the Court should protect oral sex from criminalization, 
that would still leave the state free to regulate a lot of other sex-
ual activity (like anal sex) that clearly was prohibited in 1868. So 
Eskridge quickly retreats from this foray into alien territory, 
concluding that originalism is neither objective nor constrained. 
He calls it "conservative," not intending a compliment. (p. 165) 
4. The Policy Attack 
The final argument Eskridge offers against Hardwick is that 
it is bad policy, resting on irrational prejudice and discredited as-
sumptions. Adducing studies by experts in anthropology, biol-
ogy, and psychology, Eskridge argues "there is nothing intrinsi-
cally dysfunctional about same-sex intimacy, including 
'homosexual sodomy."' (p. 167) In addition to their homophobic 
defects, sodomy laws have been used to undermine the rights of 
criminal defendants by allowing prosecutors to bootstrap sod-
omy charges onto rape charges. If the jury isn't convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the sex was coerced, but thinks it 
probably was, it can acquit on the rape charge but convict for 
sodomy. (p. 171) 
56. A narrow approach to originalism, considering only the known views of the 
drafters about specific policy issues, would have to unravel much of Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment might well have been 
even more satisfied with racial segregation and sex inequality than with state regulation 
of consensual sexual activity in private homes. But that has not stopped equal protection 
jurisprudence from undoing their specific preferences in the areas of race and sex. 
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Then there is AIDS. Eskridge argues that sodomy laws im-
pede public education about HIV transmission by criminalizing 
the underlying conduct. Public health experts generally agree 
that such education is the best way to fight transmission of the 
virus. Sodomy laws keep sex hidden, in the closet, which is "pre-
cisely the terrain that bred and spread HIV in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s." (p. 172) Challenging this observation, however, is 
an uncomfortable correlation: the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when HIV initially spread, were also a time of unprecedented 
sexual freedom comins9 on the heels of the widespread decrimi-
nalization of sodomy. Still, the bulk of the policy evidence is 
on Eskridge's side. In addition to their other flaws, sodomy laws 
have been a wasteful and counterproductive means to combat 
the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases. 
Less persuasive is the idea that Hardwick "wounded" the 
Court (p. 150) or undermined its "legitimacy," (p. 165) claims 
that have the ring of wishful thinking. While it has been widely 
unpopular among academics, the decision does not seem to have 
weakened the Court's standing in the eyes of the public. 
Eskridge presents no evidence that it has. Other decisions, like 
Roe, which feminists generally approve, are much better candi-
dates for self-inflicted battery by the Court. 
B. SEX AS SPEECH 
Eskridge goes after two controversial policies, the federal 
ban on military service by open homosexuals and state sodomy 
laws, on First Amendment grounds. The first challenge to the 
military policy, arguing that an expression of identity ("I am 
gay") by a member of the armed forces is protected speech, is 
unexceptional but has not yet been successful. Courts have gen-
erally deferred in this area to the military's professed judgment 
that the exclusion of openly gay personnel is served by substan-
tial government interests (e.g., unit cohesion and morale) unre-
lated to the suppression of the identity speech. 
The second challenge to the military policy and to sodomy 
laws generally- that sexual activity like sodomy is expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment-seeks to exploit the 
ambiguity and ambivalence in a few "symbolic speech" decisions 
57. A majority of states still had sodomy laws in 1981, when AIDS was first diag-
nosed in the United States. 
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from the Supreme Court. This argument is more interesting and 
audacious than the first. It is the one I will address here. 
The structure of the argument is straightforward. The First 
Amendment protects more than "speech" understood as oral or 
written expression. It also protects, Eskridge asserts, conduct 
"that is intended to communicate a message and would be un-
derstood by others as communicative." So, for example, majori-
ties of the Supreme Court have held that flag-burning, destroy-
ing a draft card, erotic dancing, and wearing a swastika are forms 
of expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment refuge. (p. 
176) It is a congenial doctrine for a smart advocate looking to 
expand the personal freedom protected by the Constitution. 
Eskridge uses it adeptly. He argues that for many people 
sexual intercourse is filled with deep personal meaning. "For 
most of us," he writes, "the acts of intercourse communicate 
love, appreciation, joy, and passion to one's partner." (p. 177-
78) That much is inarguable. These "ideas," he continues, are at 
least as "communicative" as erotic dancing and flag-burning. 
Moreover, treating sexual acts as expressive conduct serves what 
he offers as three values underlying the First Amendment: 
autonomy, pluralism, and equality. Once sexual acts are under-
stood as protected speech, government cannot regulate them on 
the basis of the content of their message (although it may have 
other sufficient regulatory justifications). Free speech becomes 
a libertarian charter. 
A major problem with this argument is that Gaylaw offers 
no general theory of what separates "expressive conduct" pro-
tected by the First Amendment from inexpressive conduct not 
protected. This is a surprising omission in a book that proposes 
a counterintuitive application of a speech right to protect sexual 
liberty. What Eskridge calls the "threshold inquiry"- whether 
the conduct is intended to communicate a message and is so un-
derstood by others- is little more than a restatement of the 
problem. Almost all behavior communicates some message and 
is understood as message-bearing by others. Gay marriage, pub-
lic sex, and rape are all communicative in this sense. Even rec-
reational dancing, which Eskridge acknowledges has no First 
Amendment protection, sends messages about appropriate uses 
of the human body, suggesting sex among other things. For that 
exact reason, recreational dancing has been a focus of moral 
concern for some religious denominations. Eskridge says drug 
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use is not expressive because it is done "to satisfy a bodily crav-
ing." (p. 198)58 Yet isn't much sex, protected under his theory, 
the satisfaction of physical desire? And why isn't satisfying a 
bodily craving itself a message to others that it's acceptable to do 
so? Name an activity and someone will find a message. 
The doctrinal uncertainty about expressive conduct is not a 
problem of Eskridge's making. It's a gift from the Supreme 
Court, which has noted the limited nature of conduct-as-speech 
without offering much clear guidance. Thus, in United States v. 
O'Brien, the draft-card burning case, the Court advised, "We 
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging 
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. "59 In Texas v. 
Johnson, the flag-burning case, the Court noted, "The govern-
ment generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct 
than it has in restricting the written or spoken word. "60 But what 
do these cautionary statements mean? 
The "threshold inquiry" may be more strict than Eskridge 
suggests. The Court hasn't simply asked: was the conduct "in-
tended to communicate a message" that would "be understood 
by others as communicative"? (p. 176) Instead, the Court has in-
quired whether '"[a]n intent to convey a particularized message 
was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that themes-
sage would be understood by those who viewed it. "'61 The flag-
burning and draft-card destruction cases pass this test more eas-
ily than does private sexual activity. It's relatively easy to appre-
ciate the message-or at least the narrow range of messages-
intended to be sent by destroying a draft card at an anti-war 
rally, for example. 
But what is the message of taking a person home from a bar 
for a one-night stand, or having sex with a lover after an argu-
ment, or doing it in a new position? At least for some people on 
58. Eskridge adds that drug usc is '"often done alone.'" (p. 198) Even if solitary 
drug usc doesn't at least indirectly send a message to others about the appropriateness of 
such usc, this distinction raises an anomaly: group drug usc might enjoy constitutional 
protection while drug usc by a single person sil!ing alone would not. 
59. 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968). 
60. 491 U.S. 397,406 (1989). 
61. Id. at 404 (emphasis added) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-
11 (1974)). The Court's decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995), casts doubt on the Johnson standard. ("[A] 
narrow, succinctly articulablc message is not a condition of Constitutional protcc· 
tion .... ").The Court's negative statement about what the Constitution does not require 
offers no guidance on what it does require. 
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some occasions sex is little more than pleasurable calisthenics or 
scratching an itch. (p. 179) In each instance, how is the act per-
ceived? Is the message highly likely to be understood-or more 
likely to be misunderstood? Sex is such a variegated and rich 
experience, loaded with so much ambiguity and emotion and in-
stinct and inadequately understood impulses, that it would be fa-
cetious to say it sends a discernible message comparable to burn-
ing a flag at a public protest. So much hope-often false hope-
attends the act of sex that it seems just as likely the significance 
of it will be mistaken by the recipient than that it will be under-
stood. 
Sex is different from recognized forms of symbolic speech in 
another way. Who is the audience? Unlike the flag-burning and 
draft-card mutilation cases, which involved public acts, sex (at 
least in the form Eskridge defends it) occurs in private.62 
Eskridge argues that distinction doesn't matter because even 
private activity can serve the libertarian and pluralist values of 
the First Amendment by allowing gays to have an experiential 
basis upon which to develop a gay identity.63 Homosexuals then 
take gay identity into the public sphere, where their perspectives 
and experiences enrich the debate. Because sex is an indispen-
sable part of this chain of communication, Eskridge believes it 
should enjoy First Amendment protection. (pp. 178-81) 
That sounds factually plausible but it is a considerable 
enlargement of free speech jurisprudence.64 It is an argument 
that private sex contributes to the development of something (an 
identity) that then communicates a message to recipients who 
were not present when the original "speech" itself occurred. 
Eskridge would have the First Amendment protect not simply 
expressive conduct, but also indirectly expressive conduct. 
Consider the effect of this expansion of the First Amend-
ment. If it's true that much conduct is expressive, it's surely true 
that almost all conduct is at least indirectly expressive. 
62. Under a sex-as-speech theory, public sex should enjoy greater constitutional 
protection than private sex. 
63. Ironically, Eskridge also believes legal repression "helped engender a group 
identity among gay people both by persecuting them as gays and by protecting gay public 
expression." (p. 92) (emphasis original) For Eskridgc,law creates gay identity whether it 
punishes or frees homosexuals. 
64. Other reviewers of Gaylaw have noted the alarming expansiveness of 
Eskridge's First Amendment argument. Sec Richard Posner, Ask, Tell, New Republic 
52, 54-55 (Oct. II. 1999) ("The whole of criminal law would unravel if Eskridge's [First 
Amendment) argument were accepted."); Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History 
Matrers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 2035, 2046-48 (2000). 
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Eskridge's approach sweeps in the seemingly limitless variety of 
conduct the Supreme Court has been trying to fence out. If it 
has the serious defect of constitutionalizing almost all private 
and public behavior- however criminal and harmful we have 
heretofore regarded that conduct- at least it has the virtue of 
nearly eliminating line-drawing problems. Few lines will be 
drawn. 
Even if conduct is expressive, Eskridge notes it can still be 
regulated if the government has a sufficient justification unre-
lated to suppression of the message. Since the state has no ade-
quate justification for regulating sodomy (p. 210) other than 
suppressing its message of gay affirmation (which is not a con-
tent-neutral justification and is therefore invalid under settled 
free-speech doctrine (p. 183)), Eskridge concludes such laws are 
unconstitutional. 
But he stops on his way down the slippery slope to protect-
ing some other activities. Even if it is communicative, drug use 
can be prohibited because of its harmful third-party effects: 
criminal activity to support drug habits, rape and disease, and 
defaults in family obligations created by the drug user's irre-
sponsible mental state. Similarly, prostitution may lead to dis-
ease and crime. (pp. 198-99) Public sex and indecency can be 
regulated because of the state's legitimate concern for children. 
(p. 201) 
In each instance, Eskridge seems to lose the courage of his 
otherwise bold sexual and constitutional convictions. The 
claimed externalities of drug use, prostitution, and public sex are 
indirect at best, and not invariably or necessarily a product of the 
activity the state wants to regulate. For example, many people 
who use drugs recreationally do so without resorting to crime or 
rape, without contracting deadly diseases, and without abandon-
ing their families. A wholesale prohibition of each of these ac-
tivities seems disproportionate to the state's asserted justifica-
tions. The justifications might support some narrowly-tailored 
regulation of the activities (e.g., designated "public sex" 
spaces-similar to adult-business zoning laws-so that parents 
can avoid taking children in those areas) but not an outright 
prohibition against them. 
If drug use, prostitution, and public sex are really expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment, it should be intoler-
able to allow the state to ban them completely on the strength of 
such narrow concerns. But we do. Enlarging the free-speech 
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principle, Eskridge weakens it. The First Amendment begins to 
lose its character as an unusually principled jurisprudence when 
it appears to become a warrant for the decisionmaker to guard 
the things she likes to do (sodomy) yet allow the state to prohibit 
things she doesn't like to do (public sex). That's not a Constitu-
tion, it's personal fiat. 
C. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR GAYS 
A major contribution of Gaylaw is its linkage of the Court's 
concern about anti-gay animus with the history of anti-gay dis-
crimination in the law. Eskridge supports heightened scrutiny 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause for 
laws classifying citizens on the basis of sexual orientation. (p. 
217-18) However, he doesn't think it is necessary to add gays to 
the list of groups protected by strict scrutiny analysis in order to 
invalidate much anti-gay legislation since such legislation is usu-
ally the product of animus. Evans provides substantial if incom-
pletely-crafted ammunition for this line of attack. 
Eskridge skillfully exploits the conclusion in Evans that 
anti-gay prejudice alone (animus) cannot be the basis for legisla-
tion. Such prejudice is present, according to Eskridge, when 
laws are backed by "traditional antigay tropes that are not sup-
ported by experience or empirical evidence.,. Among these 
tropes are the ideas, seen in much of the history he discusses, 
that gays are "dirty sexualized subhumans," that they are "con-
spiratorial" and "sexually predatory," and that it is necessary 
and appropriate to protect "stable heterosexual identity" and 
gender roles against them. (p. 211) 
Eskridge also links anti-gay discrimination to sex discrimi-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause, focusing particularly 
on why federal and state bans on gay marriage are a form of sex 
discrimination analogous to the race discrimination inherent in 
unconstitutional anti-miscegenation laws. (pp. 218-31)65 He ad-
ditionally attacks gay marriage bans as a denial of a fundamental 
liberty interest. (pp. 274-75)66 Ultimately, however, he agrees 
with Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein that for pragmatic rea-
65. The Vermont Supreme Court reJected this analogy in Baker. See Baker, 744 
A.2d 864,880 n.13 (lYYY). 
66. The fundamental right-to-marry argument, like the First Amendment argu-
ment, projects too far. As Andrew Koppelman notes. the right must have implicit limits. 
"It cannot mean that I have a right to marry my goldfish, or my sofa." Koppelman, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. at 2046 (cited in note 64). Gada><· offers no theory of what those limits 
might be. 
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sons the Court should stay its hand on same-sex marriage, letting 
legislatures and state courts grapple with the issue.67 
I pass over the discussion of same-sex marriage in Gaylaw 
because it adds little to arguments previously made on the sub-
ject, including arguments formulated by Eskridge himself.68 It is 
worth noting, however, how conservative he can sound on the 
issue: he justifies marriage, with "its requirement of fidelity," 69 in 
part as a method of "taming the wild beast" of gay male promis-
cuity. (p. 228) This style of argument has earned him harsh- but 
unpersuasive-critics among sexualliberationists.70 
Whether the subject is sodomy laws, (pp. 209-11) custody 
and adoption laws, (pp. 211-15) or the military's exclusion of 
openly gay personnel, (pp. 215-18) the structure of Eskridge's 
Equal Protection attack on the law is the same: identify the ani-
mus behind the policy and then show it cannot be supported by 
empirical evidence (often in the form of social science). One ex-
ample of the method, and its potential weakness, will suffice. 
Consider his attack on anti-gay adoption and child custody 
laws. Three states-Arizona, Florida, and Utah-forbid adop-
tions by homosexuals. A larger number of states presume 
against child custody and adoption by gays. (p. 212) A possible 
basis for these laws is that gays are not fit parents or aren't as 
likely as straights to be fit parents; it's generally just not in the 
best interests of children to be raised by gays. This looks like a 
public-regarding justification for such laws, which Eskridge says 
is permissible, rather than sheer anti-gay animus, which he cor-
rectly says is impermissible after Evans. (p. 213) 
But Eskridge maintains this best-interests justification is 
mere pretext for anti-gay animus, based especially on the false 
stereotype that gays prey sexually upon children. How does he 
know the justification is a facade? He knows because "dozens of 
empirical studies" have shown that there is no difference be-
tween homosexual and heterosexual parents; that there is no dif-
67. Compare pp. 228-31 with Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual 
Marriage? And If So, Who Should Decide?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1585-86 (1997), and 
Cass R. Sunstcin, One Case At A Time: Judicial Minima/ism on the Supreme Court 161 
(Harvard U. Press, 1999). 
68. Sec William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case For Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual 
Libertv to Civilized Commitmenr (Free Press, 1996) 
69~ The source of this fidelity requirement is unclear since Eskridge supports the 
decriminalization of adultery. (p. 269) 
70. Sec, for example, Michael Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and 
the Ethics of Queer Life 92-95 (Free Press, 1999) (calling Eskridge's moral support for 
same-sex marriage a "revisionist and powerfully homophobic narrative"). 
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ference in self-esteem or the incidence of emotional disorder for 
children raised by gay parents; that homosexual men are less 
likely to molest children than heterosexual men; that women, in-
cluding gay women, are least likely to do so; and so on. (pp. 213-
14 f 1 Because there is no credible factual backing for the claims 
made in support of anti-gay adoption and child custody laws, the 
only remaining explanation for them is animus. 
There are two basic problems with this line of argument, 
both of which show overconfidence in the resolution of conten-
tious social issues by courts. First, Eskridge is too sanguine 
about what is really debatable and inconclusive social science on 
gay parenting. The studies he cites have been characterized by 
small sample sizes and nonrandom canvassing of subjects. 
Nearly all have involved gay female, rather than gay male, par-
ents.7- Elsewhere, Eskridge recognizes the provisional nature of 
the findings. "This is still a new area of inquiry," he writes, just 
70 pages after arguing for close constitutional scrutiny of anti-
gay child-rearing laws. "[L]engthy time series have not been re-
ported yet, and the samples have generally been small and non-
random." (p. 285) The truth is, we still can't be certain what ef-
fect gay parents have on the development of their children. 
The weight of the available evidence supports Eskridge's 
empirical conclusion that good parenting does not depend on the 
sexual orientation of the parents. But is an opposing position, 
taking a cautious policy approach to the raising of children, 
really irrational and therefore unconstitutional? If the state of 
positive knowledge in a field supports no more than a tentative 
or probable conclusion on an issue, as it appears to do on the is-
sue of gay parenting, shouldn't states decide the contestable pol-
icy choices? Why are courts, with all their institutional limita-
tions, better positioned than legislatures, with all their political 
prejudices, to decide complex and doubtful matters of social pol-
71. Eskridge similarly uses empirical evidence to undermine anti-sodomy laws, (p. 
210) the military's gay ban, and state employment policies barring gays. (p. 215) 
72. Philip A. Belcastro ct al., A Review of Data Based Studies Addressing the Effects 
of Homosexual Parenting on Children's Sexual and Social Functioning," 20 J. Divorce & 
Remarriage 105, 107-09 (1993) (studies have lacked external validity, arc non-random, 
and tainted by possible researcher bias); Mike Allen and Nancy Burrell, Comparing the 
Impact of Homosexual and Heterosexual Parems on Children: Meta-Analysis of Existing 
Research, 32 J. Homosexuality 19, 28-30 (1996) (correcting for some, but not all, of the 
problems identified by Belcastro, ct al.). There is, to be sure, a lively academic debate 
over the significance of the various studies. At the very least, as Eskridge himself con-
cedes, there is certainly some stress visited on the children of gay households because of 
teasing by other children. (p. 285) 
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icy? Legislators may be wrong in some of the choices they make 
regarding adoption and child custody, but they are not necessar-
ily crazy. If it's morning for the empirical work, how can it be af-
ternoon for the Constitution? 
The second problem with this attack on the adoption and 
custody laws is that it fails to account for the ambiguity, com-
plexity, and shifting nature of public policy choice. It seems rea-
sonable to suspect most anti-gay adoption and custody laws have 
arisen from unreflective prejudice and stereotype rather than 
from dispassionate caution about conflicting and tentative em-
pirical data. This suspicion is amply justified by the history 
Eskridge recites, especially the arguments, at least some of them 
now entirely discredited, advanced by opponents of gay child-
rearing. (p. 214) But it could be that policymakers have reached 
the right conclusions (e.g., a presumption against gay adoptions) 
for the wrong reasons (e.g., they see gays as child molesters or 
simply bend to the will of constituents who viscerally dislike 
gays). 
Or it could be that a policy once defended for a constitu-
tionally impermissible reason is now defensible for debatable, 
but permissible, reasons. While Eskridge makes a very convinc-
ing case that "laws focusing on homosexuality or gay people 
have usually been motivated by hysterical, obsessional, or narcis-
sistic and not public-regarding, fact-based reasoning," (p. 217) it 
could be that the same or similar laws now find legitimate, non-
animus-based support. 
Suppose a state-run blood bank historically refused to take 
blood from gay men because it despised them or because it 
thought homosexuality itself was a blood-borne disease. The 
first reason would be an impermissible animus-based justifica-
tion for the policy; the second, if maintained today, would be 
empirically unsupportable and therefore likely a mask for mere 
animus. After Evans, the policy would seem to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. But suppose today the same policy is justi-
fied by (1) the greater likelihood that gay men are HIV-infected 
than the general population, and (2) the fact that virus-detection 
tests for blood are imprecise and prone to error, including a lag 
time between the date of infection and the detection of HIV by 
standard tests. There would then be an arguable, public-
regarding justification available for the policy excluding gay men 
from blood donations: it is rational risk-management, not preju-
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dice. 73 It's the same policy targeting gays, but with a different 
justification. What result under a theory that such classifications 
are "usually" animus-based? 
Recall also Eskridge's distinction between traditional anti-
gay stereotypes (animus) and traditional public-regarding rea-
sons (morality) as justifications for state policy. (p. 212) He 
treats these as if they are clean, discrete categories. It's hard 
enough to know when a legislature has been motivated by one or 
the other, or even to distinguish between the two. But suppose a 
policy can be traced to both impermissible animus and permissi-
ble morality? This might be true not only in the adoption con-
text but in the federal ban on gay military service, where pure 
prejudice mixes with contestable concern for unit morale and 
cohesion. As a policy matter, again, Eskridge has the best of his 
opponents on the military exclusion. But should he get the best 
of them by command of Congress or by command of the Consti-
tution? What is a court to do when faced with a mixed array of 
prejudice and plausible public-regarding rationales for classifica-
tions directed at gays? Gaylaw doesn't offer clear guidance. 
D. THE UNWRIITEN SEXUALITY CLAUSE 
Gaylaw isn't quite finished with its constitutional adventure. 
It draws finally on the idea that important similarities between 
religion and sexual orientation should influence the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. Unfortunately, although Gaylaw offers 
some intriguing insights on this question, its implications for the 
Constitution are strained. Gay identity and religious identity are 
just too different to make the effort convincing. 
Why is Eskridge interested in finding common ground for 
religion and sexual orientation? "Although America has inter-
nalized the idea of benign religious variation ... , it rejects the 
idea of benign sexual variation," Eskridge observes. (p. 293) 
(emphasis original) The more religion and sexual orientation are 
thought to share important traits, the harder it is politically and 
culturally to accept deviance in the former but reject it in the lat-
ter. If religion and sexual orientation are comparable, maybe 
some of the acceptance now accorded once-despised religious 
73. This would certainly he true if the hloml hank similarly barred donations from 
members of other high-risk. groups (e.g .. intravenous drug u~ers and hemophiliacs). 
Something like the hypothetical blood hank"s policy is currently the policy of the Food 
and Drug Administration. "F.D.A. Panel Rejects Bid to Ease Ban on Blood donations 
hy Gays:· N.Y. Times A25 (Sept. 15. 2000). 
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minorities like Jews, Mormons, and Catholics will be extended 
to gays. 
Eskridge's Constitution has a sort of unwritten sexuality 
clause that protects the free exercise of sexuality and prohibits 
the government from establishing an approved sexual orienta-
tion. After acknowledging there are no explicit "sexuality 
clauses" in the Constitution analogous to the First Amendment's 
religion clauses, he submits that the similarities between religion 
and sexual orientation- and similarities between the prejudices 
they have inspired- "can inform judges' reading of the due proc-
ess and equal protection obligations of the Constitution." (p. 
302) (Just how it is supposed to do this is never spelled out in 
Gaylaw.) This imaginative conclusion needs closer inspection. 
Eskridge perceives three points in common between relig-
ion and sexual orientation, each less supportable than the one 
before. First, unlike biological sex and race, religious and sexual 
identity are not detectable unless the individual self-identifies or 
engages in observed behavior that betrays the identity. Both re-
ligious and sexual minorities can "pass" as members of the ma-
jority. (p. 297) To escape persecution, both religious and sexual 
minorities have historically done precisely that. 
Second, he argues, unlike race neither religion nor sexual 
orientation are popularly seen as being determined by biology. 
One's religion or sexuality need not be the same as one's par-
ents; they are seen as chosen in a sense that race is clearly not. 
The fact that they are seen as voluntary makes deviant choices in 
either religion or sexual orientation seem blameworthy and 
therefore open to repression. (p. 297) Since we nevertheless do 
not repress the choice of religion we should not repress the 
choice of sexual orientation. 
This second point of comparison is trickier. The best evi-
dence available now suggests that sexual orientation is not con-
sciously chosen. It is a likely product of genetics, biology, pre-
conscious developmental influences, or some combination of 
these. Religion is different; although the basic religious impulse 
may not be consciously chosen, membership in a particular relig-
ion can be consciously chosen. For a gay-equality advocate to 
concede any similarity between religion and sexual orientation 
on the question of choice may be to surrender too much terri-
tory. Not all individual choices are equal under the Constitution. 
The First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses explicitly protect religious practice regardless of whether 
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we see it as a choice; it's much harder to argue the Constitution 
protects sexual orientation once it is thought to be chosen rather 
than innate. 
The third point of comparison between religion and sexual 
orientation is the least persuasive of all. Eskridge argues that 
both religious and sexual subcultures are nomic communities, 
meaning that they are "people bonded by associations that pre-
serve and develop a common normative heritage." They "have a 
vision of what is morally good." (pp. 294) They are people 
linked by "similar emotions and beliefs, moments of ritual ec-
stasy and fantasy, and fascination with sumptuary pomp." (pp. 
297-98) As applied to religion, nomos might seem an accurate 
term. 
As applied to sexual orientation, however, nomos is factu-
ally unsupportable. What is the "common normative heritage" 
of gays in America? What is its content and where do we find it? 
There is certainly no high priest or ayatollah of homosexuality. 
There is no gay sacred text, like a Bible or a Koran or a Book of 
Mormon. There is no authoritative source for a common "vision 
of what is morally good." 
And what do we make of Eskridge's notion that gays share 
with religion "[a] fascination with sumptuary pomp"? Gaylaw 
offers no support for this exotic assertion about gay life. It 
sounds not just erroneous, but bizarre. It is quite possibly based 
on stereotypes about fussy gay men with their teacup collections, 
fascination with tragic divas, and love of show tunes and opera. 
It's the Newport fairies come back to haunt the Constitution. 
Eskridge contends that gays have "similar experiences that 
have engendered a common framework of thinking about a wide 
range of issues" and "a collective commitment to implementing 
shared values in people's lives." (p. 304) These are aggressive 
and dubious claims to make about a group marked by every 
manner of racial, economic, national, religious, political, familial, 
physical, and even sexual diversity. There is only one thing we 
can say with some confidence all gays share: primary sexual at-
traction to members of the same sex. After that, the experiences 
of that sexual attraction, the discrimination encountered because 
of that orientation, and certainly the normative and policy con-
clusions drawn from those experiences and from that discrimina-
tion, vary so widely that any notion of a common normative heri-
tage or shared values seems more aspirational than descriptive. 
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Gaylaw does not catalog the elements of this asserted com-
mon normative heritage or shared values. But they are sug-
gested in various ways. I say "suggested" because the book 
never lists them. Instead, especially in its final chapter, Gaylaw 
tends to make sweeping assertions about what conclusions "gay 
experience" leads to. For example, Eskridge writes that "[g]ay 
experience resists" placing too much emphasis on the traditional 
legal distinction between public (governmental) and private ac-
tion.74 (p. 309) The implication is that any disagreement among 
gays must be the result of false consciousness by those homo-
sexuals on the wrong side of "gay experience." 
The first element of gays' hypothesized common normative 
heritage might be a shared rejection of gender role, but that is an 
invalid proposition for the reasons suggested in Part II above. 
Another candidate might be a shared distrust of sexual regula-
tion, but that is implausible if it extends to the legalization of 
things like prostitution and adult incest. Yet another candidate 
might be a shared belief that eliminating governmental discrimi-
nation is insufficient as a means to secure liberty, but that dis-
misses a large and thoughtful population of libertarian gays who 
conclude from gay historical experience that government should 
be systematically distrusted. At least Eskridge does not pretend 
gay experience leads to a peculiarly homosexual view about af-
firmative action. (p. 321) 
If by positing a common normative heritage Eskridge means 
to describe an actual, existing consensus among gays about a 
wide range of social, moral, and political issues then he is just 
wrong. He offers no evidence to support the existence of such a 
consensus and in the absence of such documentation its exis-
tence is extremely implausible. 
On the other hand, if by positing a common normative heri-
tage Eskridge means not to describe gay communities but to of-
fer what he takes to be the best conclusions that can be drawn 
from gay experience and history, he is as free as anyone to make 
arguments. And he may win the argument on some points. But 
in that case, he is not describing an actual gay nomos, he is hop-
ing for one. 
74. On the contrary, gay experience might lead to the opposite conclusion: state 
intrusion into, and regulation of, the private sphere has been a disaster for homosexuals 
for more than a century. See Part I supra. The regulatory state that cut its teeth on gays 
can scarcely be trusted by them. 
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The failure to justify the analogy between religion and sex-
ual orientation is not a small one. Religion is a system of belief 
rooted in faith in the supernatural; sexual orientation is not a 
system of belief, not rooted in faith, and not tied to the super-
natural. If discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
wrong, as Eskridge and I agree it is, it's not for the same reasons 
that discrimination on the basis of religion (or sex) is wrong. It's 
for independent reasons. It must lean on the particularity thesis. 
And if religion and sexual orientation are so different, there is 
no warrant for judges to read religion-like precepts into the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses applied to sexual varia-
tion. 
IV. GA YLA W'S MORALITY 
The final section of Gaylaw is a potpourri of theory and pol-
icy discussion. It expands upon constitutional arguments previ-
ously made regarding gay marriage (pp. 274-75) and child cus-
tody and adoption by gay parents. (pp. 275-78) It is the most 
abstract and least tightly-organized section of the book, often 
redundant of previous material,75 finishing with a vague sugges-
tion for compromise in the clash of gay rights and religious lib-
erty. (pp. 302-23) 
But just when you think you can safely stop reading, Gay-
law takes a fresh turn. For example, Eskridge ends his flirtation 
with libertarianism by announcing that "gaylaw realizes that 
freedom from state interference is not liberty when private dis-
crimination and violence are pervasive." (p. 240)76 Liberty re-
quires not a minimal, neutral state, but the affirmative assistance 
of the state through various means, including employment non-
discrimination laws. (pp. 233-36) The extensive history of state 
involvement in gay life has not led Eskridge to a categorical re-
jection of government power, although he remains wary of it. 
The regulatory state that cut its teeth on gay people is not bad in 
itself; it's bad when it bites badly. 
75. For example, the section revisits several times tht: data on children raist:d in gay 
households. (pp. 281, 285, 287) 
76. We should have seen this coming when Eskridge praised the "republican vision 
of the state as exemplar of public values," calling it "attractive." In fact Eskridge differs 
with moralists Patrick Devlin and Justice Scalia not in the appropriateness of the state 
modeling a republican vision but in the content of that vision. (p. 199) (criticizing Devlin 
and Scalia for backing "the values of the nineteenth rather than the tw<:ntv-first cen-
tury") · 
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An even more significant fresh turn awaits the patient 
reader. Gaylaw is clear that liberal neutrality has only a dim vi-
sion of life. (p. 278) The legal and political cause of gay equality 
needs a substantive argument that it is good, not just a prefer-
ence for the state to stay out of the way. It also needs a vision of 
the good life that rejects the relativist notion that all choices are 
equal. 
An advantage of moving beyond strict neutrality is that it 
enables advocates to make a moral case for gay equality. To 
heterosexuals, the moral advocate of gay equality, as opposed to 
the libertarian one, can argue not simply that gays should have 
rights (like a right to marry), but that such rights are right. To 
gays, the moral advocate argues not just that marriage is a choice 
but that it is a better choice than others. The non-neutral state is 
free to nudge citizens in a healthy direction (e.g., by making 
available marriage, with its state-created package of legal good-
ies) as long as it does not coerce them in that direction (e.g., by 
requiring marriage). 
Abandoning neutrality is a necessary maneuver in discus-
sions about families, which focus less on the rights of individuals 
than on their needs. Consider that rights rhetoric is especially 
unpersuasive when children are involved. If Roe had involved a 
claimed constitutional right to remove a wart from the body, in-
stead of an unborn child, no one today would care about the de-
cision, however unhistorical and activist recognition of such a 
right might be. If excluding gays from adoption and custody can 
be shown to harm children by removing an entire class of loving 
parents from an already shallow pool of available caretakers, 
then such laws are themselves immoral. 
Eskridge is an unabashed moral advocate of gay equality, 
which is a welcome move away from a pure rights discourse that 
grows anemic and alienating. "Human beings are not autono-
mous bundles of exogenously defined preferences seeking satis-
faction," Eskridge writes, piercing liberalism's heart. "Instead, 
we are social beings struggling to make connections with one an-
other." (p. 283) Consider this: 
"[A]rguments for gay families must rest on something more 
profound than choice, and they in fact do: gay families are 
good for gay people and good for America because they pro-
vide fora in which people form mutual commitments and chil-
dren are reared. Any effort by the state to discourage gay 
families is perverse because it discourages commitment and 
harms children." (p. 278) 
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This passage marks a profound shift in gay legal and politi-
cal theory. 77 Gaylaw is not just another collection of liberal ar-
guments for gay rights; it is a call for equality and inclusion that 
has a moral and social message. In the most evocative passage in 
Gaylaw, Eskridge asks readers to imagine they are sitting in an 
airplane plummeting to the ground. 
"What goes through your mind in the last minutes of life? For 
most of us, it would not be the great sex we had, the property 
we have acquired, or the awards we have won. It would, in-
stead, be the parents who nurtured us, the romances we have 
enjoyed, and the children we have raised. The magic mo-
ments are relational, and the memories of those we have 
touched and who touched us will form an indefinite chain of 
being between our parents and those who survive us." (p. 
286) 
A straight person might not understand the pleasure of a 
particular homosexual act, or may in fact be repulsed by it. But 
every person, regardless of sexual orientation, can understand 
the sentiment in that passage. 
Gay couples bond in the same way straight couples do. (pp. 
285-86) Legal recognition of a gay couple will likely "enhance 
the durability of the relationship," just as we expect it to do for a 
straight couple. (p. 287) It will also impress upon everyone, gays 
included, that life is not simply about rights belonging to indi-
viduals but about responsibilities owed to those around us. Thus, 
Eskridge criticizes domestic partnerships as a legal alternative to 
marriage not simply because they confer pitiably few benefits to 
participants but because they impose pitiably few reciprocal ob-
ligations on them. Without such obligations, domestic partner-
ships are "empty liberalism." (p. 289) 
Gaylaw thus begins to make a case for gay equality to those 
people-often social conservatives-concerned about the de-
cline of the social and moral health of the country. Rather than 
tearing at the fabric of society, gay equality can strengthen it by 
bringing an entire class of citizens into the mainstream institu-
tions of American life. Given that gays exist, and that more than 
a century of legal repression has failed to eliminate homosexuals, 
77. Eskridge is not the first writer to argue for a gay politics and jurisprudence of 
moral substance. Sec, e.g., MichaelJ. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: 
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77. Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1989) (arguing that the "justice (or 
injustice) of laws against abortion and homosexual sodomy depends at least inpart, on 
the morality (or immorality) of those practices"). 
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what is to be done with them? The principled citizen concerned 
with the moral and social climate would want, to borrow 
Eskridge's phrase, to move them "from sexual liberty to civilized 
commitment." You want to reduce weirdness? Then stop push-
ing people towards it by tormenting and excluding them at every 
turn. 
What Eskridge calls "the traditionalist focus on obligation 
of each spouse to the family" is consistent with the recognition 
of gay families. On the other hand, the "liberal focus on auton-
omy of each spouse" is not a necessary step in recognizing gay 
families. (p. 280) Though Eskridge does not go so far, a moral 
gay-equality advocate could oppose the "liberal shift that 
brought the country no-fault divorce and high rates of marital 
breakups," (p. 280) could support laws against adultery, and 
could endorse "covenant marriages" that offer couples the op-
tion to enter a stricter legal commitment than standard marriage. 
V. CONCLUSION: GAY LAW'S LIMITS 
Gaylaw has its limits. They are theoretical, constitutional, 
and political. 
Its gender theory has limited explanatory and normative 
force. Underlying the book is the familiar but rickety idea in 
gay-feminist scholarship that issues of sexual nonconformity and 
gender nonconformity cannot be separated. This approach re-
duces homosexuality to gender rebellion and treats anti-gay dis-
crimination as a wholly-owned subsidiary of sex discrimination. 
It fails to account for the diversity of gay life, misses the perverse 
role law and social stigma play in gender deviance, allows the 
enemies of gay equality to frame the debate, confines gays to an 
identity prison, and leaves intact many contemporary arguments 
against gay equality. If it is not completely wrong it is at least 
inadequate to the project of achieving equality. 
The book's aggressive constitutional agenda is limited by 
the weak legs propping it up. None of the arguments Gaylaw of-
fers for overruling Hardwick is a slam-dunk. The ambitious ar-
gument for the protection of sexual liberty as a form of speech is 
incomplete, lacking a theory of what constitutes expressive con-
duct. The Equal Protection analysis is too confident about 
doubtful empirical matters, inviting courts to impose solutions 
on complex and important social problems. And the analogy of 
homosexuality to religion is so tenuous it cannot be used to 
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magnify courts' constitutional scrutiny of anti-gay discrimina-
tion. 
Gaylaw has limited political appeal. On the left, it will draw 
critics who distrust traditional institutions like marriage, or who 
want a movement that emphasizes untethered sexual freedom 
rather than commitment, or who disdain its pragmatic and com-
promising tone on matters such as accommodating anti-gay reli-
gious beliefs. 
At the same time, Gaylaw is no apology for a right-wing 
jurisprudential or policy agenda. Many conservatives will be 
wary of its activist constitutional project and its embrace of gay 
marriage and openly gay military service. They will disapprove 
its willingness to experiment with the legalization of prostitution, 
adultery, adult incest, (pp. 268-69) and "third-parent" adoptions. 
(p. 292) They will be dismayed at its hesitation to criminalize 
adult-adolescent sex. (p. 267) 
But the argument of Gaylaw is not pitched at the people 
who huddle around one of the poles of complete acceptance or 
rejection of gay equality. It is pitched at those who dwell some-
where on the land masses in between; that is, it is pitched at most 
thoughtful people. By linking historical repression to present-
day discrimination, Gaylaw gives that large and critical constitu-
ency some context with which to evaluate modern controversies 
over the place of gays in society and in the law. By demanding 
consistency from constitutional decisionmaking, Gaylaw shames 
them into reconsidering doctrines that have thoughtlessly short-
changed an entire class of citizens. And by envisioning a move-
ment concerned not solely with rights but also with relations, 
Gaylaw shows them the core human dimension of gay equality. 
Whatever the limits of its power, and they are considerable, 
Gaylaw shakes the ground under our feet. 
